This monograph examines the use of Foreign Internal Defense (FID) and Unconventional Warfare (UW) as the primary means of preventing global insurgency. The paper is broken into four sections. The History section gives a basic background of Special Operations Forces, with emphasis on historical examples relevant to this topic. The historical overview shows that insurgency is an old form of warfare and is traditionally difficult to fight. The history of special operations shows a divergence over the past fifty years that has caused a decreasing capability in executing and coordinating FID and UW operations. Following the history, are three recommendations, each with internal supporting exposition. Recommendation 1 is to incorporate a FID mindset into military training and education. A FID mindset embraces the concept that in virtually all U.S. operations conducted on foreign soil, the ultimate goal is to transition authority to a sovereign Host Nation (HN) that is acceptable to U.S. government policy. By embracing this mindset, planners will better be able to shape operations during the high intensity conflict phase in order to better prepare the force for the following stabilizing phases and transfer to civil authority. Recommendation 2 is to remove U.S. Army Special Forces Groups (SFG) from Iraq and Afghanistan in order to use them in a global FID and UW campaigns. The SFGs are the nation's premiere force in conducting FID and UW operations and often do so in direct support of strategic aims and goals. Unfortunately, most of our SFGs are, currently, completely dedicated to Iraq and Afghanistan conducting tactical level missions. This focus on just two countries seriously degrades Special Force's ability to conduct global shaping missions and, therefore, decreases the global security posture of the U.S. Pulling the SFGs out of Iraq and Afghanistan will allow them to increase their presence globally, which leads to better security for the U.S. Recommendation 3 is to form a new unit at the national level that has the primary responsibility of planning, executing, coordination and synchronizing global FID and UW. The U.S. currently has a superb structure for fighting terrorists. The Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) is well structured to combat terrorists in an extremely efficient manner. There is no mechanism currently in the U.S. military to fight global terrorism. The distinction between fighting terrorists and fighting terrorism is subtle, yet profound. This new unit would exist at exactly the same level as JSOC and have similar authorities and resourcing, but it would focus all its efforts on long term solutions dedicated to preventing terrorism globally. In conclusion, The U.S. military faces the unenviable position of having to fight a multi-front, asymmetric, well networked enemy that is enmeshed throughout the world. In the six years of fighting the Global War on Terror, the U.S. has done little to stem the tide of the global insurgency. Indeed, there is ample evidence that, globally, the terrorist networks are stronger today than in 2001. The recommendations suggested in this monograph will help the U.S. find long term solutions to the threats it will face in the 21st Century.

ADA 470867 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)