In August of 2006, the world witnessed a guerilla air war. Hezbollah, a non-state actor, attacked Israel from the air. The Israeli Defense Force was unable to counter this assault and its second largest city, Haifa, came under attack from long-range rockets. In addition, Hezbollah was able to launch three armed UAVs against the Israeli capital of Tel Aviv. The UAV missions failed but the precedent had been set. These events told the world that nations which in the past could never field or employ a manned air force, were able to attack well-equipped nations from the air. The combination of commercial high technology and old weapons defines the concept of guerilla air war. The emergence of guerilla air war further enables and empowers small groups to challenge wealthy nations for control of the battlefield. This monograph examines two critical issues: one, guerilla air war; and two, whether or not the existing US Army AMD structures can meet the challenge of such attacks and defeat them at the tactical level. The US Army has recently removed all tactical level AMD units. Army maneuver commanders do not posses organic surface to air systems that would enable them to engage current air threats from a guerilla air war. The US Army's AMD force has prepared for operational threats like TBMs, but these systems are judged to have limited value to the tactical commander. The monograph concludes with the argument that the removal of AMD units from the tactical level has left the Army dangerously and unnecessarily weak in certain respects. This has operational effects on the Army and the nation. As will be made clear, the Army's current AMD force is not integrated with the tactical level Army. The primary reason for this is the removal of AMD units from Corps and division level formations. By removing the AMD force from the tactical level, training has suffered and put the Army and its soldiers at risk. The most promising tactical system is C-RAM, which is revolutionizing the battlefield due to its ability to detect and destroy enemy artillery while in flight, however, C-RAM was an unexpected requirement. As a result, there are very few systems available and no clear plan for making C-RAM available to the rest of the larger Army structure. This study argues for the relevance and usefulness of mobile C-RAM systems that would allow greater protection of the Army's tactical formations, and reunite the AMD force with the tactical Army. Such a system structure would greatly enhance the Army's ability to engage and defeat guerilla air wars. My recommendation as set out in the monograph is to reintroduce a tactical level AMD system. This would take the shape of a mobile C-RAM system, combining the current C-RAM turret on a mobile vehicle. This has the benefit of being both inexpensive and straightforward. This new system could be ready very quickly because of the experience that AMD forces already have with the Vulcan and current C-RAM systems. In addition, I recommend that the AMD force should add a battalion to the Maneuver Enhancement Brigade. The reintroduction of a tactical level AMD unit would enable better combined training with the tactical level Army. Combined arms training is essential for the AMD force because AMD units will operate closely with tactical level Army units in future conflicts. Failure to conduct this training will result in more friendly fire incidents and a reduction in the capabilities of the tactical Army. Finally, the AMD branch must become more involved with the tactical level training centers and replicate a more realistic air threat to provide Army leaders with the experience they need to meet the challenge of guerilla air war.

ADA 470659 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)