This monograph examines the feasibility of logistically supporting a heavy division-sized force conducting deep maneuver. Historically, deep maneuver forces have performed such missions as raids to cut enemy supply lines and command and control facilities, exploitations, pursuits, and attacks against enemy operational reserves. The Achilles heal however, has often been the inability of deep maneuver forces to sustain themselves. A recent concept, called digitization of the battlefield, offers promise in addressing some of the sustainment challenges. This monograph examines the support requirements for such a force and how deep forces may benefit from the use of digital technology and other logistically enhancing tools. First, the monograph discusses the origins of deep maneuver. Its origins are traced back to the former Soviet Operational Maneuver Groups (OMGs) of the recent past, and Soviet Mobile Groups from World War II. Second, it examines the concept of employment for deep maneuver forces. As a basis for discussion, it uses the Mobile Strike Force (MSF). The MSF is a US Army conceptual, fully-digitized, heavy division technologies and systems projected to be available at or near the beginning of the 21st Century. It also examines similarities and differences between the MSF and OMG concepts of employment. Third, it studies the logistical challenges and concerns related to the deep maneuver concept. Finally, it examines the logistical requirements of deep maneuver divisions. The monograph concludes that logistical support is feasible, but only under certain conditions. First, deep maneuver divisions should be ordinary rather than extraordinary forces. Second, these forces should embrace digital technology. Third, they must be given missions commensurate with their logistical capabilities. Fourth, they must have a single logistics commander to ensure an integrated logistics effort.

ADA 293680 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)