This monograph examines the question of whether the United States Air Force (USAF) is too reliant upon technological asymmetry. It examines four possible paths to over-reliance and then surveys Air Force doctrine and air power theory. The study then assesses that doctrine and theory in light of potential over-reliance on technological asymmetry. The analysis shows that the USAF is over-reliant on technological asymmetry. The current air power theory and doctrine of strategic attack requires technology to replace some aspects of human decision making, technology to replace strategy (to a degree), the elimination of fog and friction, and certainty regarding enemy reactions in order to be effective. These assumptions, which are the foundation of the theory, require careful and rigorous examination - which the Air Force has not yet accomplished. Over-reliance on technological asymmetry raises fundamental concerns, and USAF thinkers must address these concerns in order to make the theory and doctrine truly viable.

ADA 301022 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)