This monograph examines the U.S. military operations in Beirut, Lebanon 1982-1983 and Somalia 1993 in the context of Clausewitz's theory of a culminating point of victory. The dynamics of peace operations present a unique challenge to military commanders. If the prudent commander is to avoid the risk of a tactical defeat with strategic consequences, a management of the factors leading to military culmination and their linkage to operational assumptions should be the keystone of any planning effort. Recognizing the culminating point of victory provides an essential perspective on the necessary force structure, disposition, and tactics to assure mission success and to prompt their reappraisal at critical junctures that might otherwise be lost in the operational background noise. The monograph proposes that an analysis of what constitutes a culminating point of victory serves to capture the subjective nature of the decision making process in a quantifiable manner. This framework facilitates the recognition and management of operational risks. A commander is then better prepared to avoid operational culmination due to a tactical defeat.

ADA 293999 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)