This paper examines the threat modern diesel submarines pose to successful joint power projection from the sea. America's force projection strategy requires littoral battlespace dominance by naval forces to give joint commanders the freedom of action afforded by a secure sea flank. The focus on operations ashore and cruise missile proliferation, magnified by the outcome of the Falkland's war, has overshadowed the submarine's more lethal sea denial weapon--the torpedo. The disadvantage that cut backs in force structure and a joint doctrine of "quick decisive victory" place on power projection efforts is exacerbated by current ASW equipment's limited effectiveness in shallow water. The offensive ASW doctrine based on the demands of maritime strategy will only work in shallow water if American ASW forces possess the same detection and attack asymmetry they enjoyed during the cold war. Current doctrine demands "zero defects ASW" with equipment which does not provide littoral battlespace dominance. When conditions ashore do not permit the joint commander the luxury of waiting for ASW forces to find and destroy submarines, the commander can easily lose critical power projection assets he needs to build combat power ashore by rushing into the torpedo danger zone.

ADA 300999 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)