This paper examines the question whether the U.S. Army should subdivide MOUT doctrine into two parts, precision MOUT and Combat In Built-Up Areas (CIBUA)? Current MOUT doctrine attempts to avoid fighting in cities. This doctrine evolved from the WWII experience and focuses on heavy forces conducting MOUT in high intensity war. There is very little in MOUT doctrine that addresses Operations Other Than War (OOTW) on the low intensity side of the spectrum of conflict. The missing piece for OOTW in urban terrain is 'Precision' MOUT. This approach incorporates the fact that civilians will always be present during military operations conducted in their cities. The two major reasons why the U.S. will inevitably commit forces to conduct Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT) are the explosive expansion in the size and number of urban areas throughout the world and the continuing U.S. engagement around the world as the remaining superpower. Urban population data suggest a trend of constant growth to continue in the future. Cities not only encroach on open maneuver space, but invariably seem to occupy positions that require their seizure for religious, political, or economic reasons. The strategic importance of cities is growing. Cities contain the centers of political power, hubs of transportation, hubs of telecommunications and centers for logistic support. History illustrates that urban battles are the most demanding, costly and complicated of military operations. There are three reasons why it is so difficult: the cost in time, manpower, and resources; the density of the terrain; and the presence of noncombatants in the battle space. Why does current MOUT doctrine need to change? The U.S. Army is smaller and will rely less on forward deployed forces. The U.S. will remain engaged around the world, positioned to resolve conflicts that are no longer defined by the strategy of containment. Adding, complexity to the problem is the influence exerted by the mass media on American public opinion and the demands to minimize collateral damage and casualties. A corollary to this phenomenon is the desire to limit the post conflict cost. This does not suggest the U.S. should discard the traditional view of urban warfare. There is still a need to have a doctrine for high intensity urban warfare. Nevertheless, the U.S. needs a new approach on urban warfare. The new approach must link MOUT and OOTW. The proposed approach is Precision MOUT. Precision MOUT is defined as the restricted and disciplined use of force in military operation other than war on urban terrain. Discipline fire is the hallmark of precision MOUT. Precision MOUT is more than fires it is a mind set or attitude for conducting disciplined operations in close proximity to civilians. Precision MOUT objectives are still to defeat the enemy while limiting noncombatant casualties and excessive collateral damage. Precision MOUT allows for a measured response, disciplined in its application to specific operations conducted in an urban setting. This study concludes there is a need for developing a more flexible, coherent and complete MOUT doctrine that incorporates the high intensity and OOTW.

ADA 293644 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)