This monograph examines Joint Task Force (JTF) SUPPORT HOPE operations to determine if aspects of this crisis response apply to all U.S. power projection operations. It provides an overview of the crisis and JTF support of U.N. and NGO relief agencies. The monograph considers military mission analysis and activation of the JTF headquarters. At the end of this study I concluded that the JCS should reevaluate procedural methods for decentralized control of military operations. Crisis action planning procedures must allow National Command Authorities to articulate intent and provide the CINC and his staff the means to present their concept in a rapidly unfolding crisis. Analysis of SUPPORT HOPE also identified the JTF staff's requirement for politico-military experience. This operation demonstrated that conditions may force the staff to deploy with little preparation and deprive the commander of critical advice in this area. Examination of SUPPORT HOPE also underscored the importance of the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986. The framers' intent envisions "joint" JTFs instead of those created from component pieces with limited augmentation from the unified command. The spirit of Goldwater-Nichols may also require the military to organize joint commands below unified command level on an extended basis to ensure that JTFs can perform as well as the legislators expected.

ADA 301121 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)