This monograph discusses the linkage between air support and the division deep battle from 1982-1994. In 1982, the Army introduced battlefield air interdiction (BAI) as an important asset for the corps and division deep battle. After the Army published the 1986 version of FM 100-5, operational level commanders assumed more control over BAI. Consequently, the division rarely received fixed wing air support for its deep battle. The Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) in Operation Desert Storm eliminated BAI and established only two categories of air support: close air support (CAS) and air interdiction (AI). Following the Gulf War, service and joint doctrine have abandoned the air support system that worked in the Gulf War and have reverted to the pre-war system without BAI. The conclusions and recommendations fall into two categories: AI and CAS. First, AI was controlled by operational commanders to attack operational targets. The operational commander exercises complete authority over AI within his battlespace. Given the success of AI during Operation Desert Storm, AI doctrine works well now. However, the Army's doctrine relies too heavily on AI for the division deep battle. Consequently, Army division doctrine requires revision. Divisions cannot reasonably expect AI sorties. Second, CAS requires significant revision. Since Operation Desert Storm ended, Army and Air Force doctrine have yet to include new employment concepts for CAS. The concept that was executed in the Gulf War represents the way of the future. CAS that extends to the limits of the division deep battle provides responsive support within the division commander's battlespace.

ADA 294122 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)