This monograph examines current US Army doctrine for military operations in urbanized terrain (MOUT), as presented in US Army Field Manual (FM) 90-10. The purpose of this examination is to determine whether the doctrine contained in the current 1979 version of FM 90-10 is still relevant to conditions on the contemporary urban battlefield. In those areas where current doctrine is found to be outdated or irrelevant, the monograph suggests improvements to bring doctrine up to date. The monograph begins by reviewing current literature on the subject of MOUT. This information is used to determine the significant features of the contemporary urban combat environment. The research data examined in the monograph indicates that MOUT is becoming both more frequent and a more decisive component in contemporary warfare. The monograph next presents three case studies of recent urban combat between modern, mechanized, non-indigenous forces and lighter non-mechanized, indigenous forces. The case studies used are: the American intervention in the Dominican Republic, 1965-1966; the Battle of Hue, Republic of Vietnam, 1968; and British operations in Belfast, Northern Ireland, 1969-1985. The purpose of these case studies is to provide counterpoints to the FM 90-10 focus on Warsaw Pact-style mechanized forces. These counterpoints are used to test the adaptability of current doctrine to meet a range of threat forces. Next, the doctrine contained in FM 90-10 concerning urban offensive and defensive operations is analyzed using data from the previous literature research and from the case studies. The goal is to determine if the doctrine contained in F\I 90-10 would have been relevant if used in situations like those described in the case studies. This analysis showed that significant portions of FM 90-10 are outdated and no longer meet the needs of an Army facing peacemaking and peacekeeping duties in a multi-polar world. The monograph concludes that a significant revision of FM 90-10 is badly needed. The goal of this revision should be to act as a catalyst that will also lead to reexamination of the Army's training system, organizational structure, and weapons design system as they affect the preparedness of the Army to effectively fight and win in a MOUT environment. In the past, the US Army has had a history of relearning how to fight MOUT only after urban fighting occurs. This monograph suggests we may no longer be willing or politically able to pay the costs in blood to relearn lessons in this way. The only alternative is to remain prepared for MOUT even in times of peace.

ADA 294070 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)