This monograph examines whether or not the U.S. possesses the strategic mobility assets required to win successfully two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts (MRCs). The current National Security Strategy (NSS) states that the U.S. must have the ability to win two nearly simultaneous MRCs. The two MRC strategies require a tremendous amount of strategic lift assets. The U.S. has historically lacked sufficient strategic lift capability. Recent studies and statements by high ranking military officers indicate the U.S. lacks sufficient strategic lift assets to execute two nearly simultaneous MRCs. This monograph is divided into eight sections. Section one, the introduction, establishes the purpose of the study and the significance of the research question to the U.S. military. Section two presents a theoretical and historical perspective to the problem of strategic deployment. Section three discusses current strategic lift assets, and examines the strengths and weaknesses of each leg of the mobility triad. Section four presents case studies of three recent nearly simultaneous operations, the 1994 deployment to Haiti (Operation Uphold Democracy), the October 1994 redeployment to Kuwait, and the concurrent tension on the Korean peninsula. Section five analyzes the ability of the U.S. to deploy and sustain forces in two nearly simultaneous MRCs. Two criteria, speed and sufficiency, are used to evaluate strategic lift assets. Section six presents an analysis of future strategic lift assets. Section seven answers the research question and presents conclusions. This final section also discusses implications for strategic mobility planners. Section eight offers recommendations. Conclusions of this study indicate that the U.S. currently lacks sufficient strategic lift assets to conduct two nearly simultaneous MRCs. The U.S. is significantly short of sealift assets for moving heavy equipment. Current acquisition programs could provide sufficient sealift assets by 2001. The U.S. is also short of strategic airlift assets. Although this shortage is not as significant as the shortage in sealift, the shortage in airlift will not be remedied until 2006. Future operational planners must be aware of the limitations that they will face due to insufficient strategic lift assets. The monograph offers four recommendations: (1) DOD reassessment of the BUR, (2) reprioritize the purchase of airlift assets, (3) increase the amount of APS and MPS, (4) and expand the use of HNS and LOGCAP, particularly in OOTW situations.

ADA 300970 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)