This monograph examines the contemporary environment of military operations on urbanized terrain (MOUT) and explores key issues that the US Army must resolve to improve its ability to conduct major operations in urban environments. From the analysis and discussion of these issues, the monograph draws conclusions about the sources of these issues and makes recommendations for implementing possible courses of action to resolve the issues. The monograph begins by examining the social, military, economic, and political forces that create the contemporary MOUT environment. The research data examined in the monograph indicates that MOUT is becoming both more frequent and a more decisive component of contemporary warfare. The monograph next discusses how the US Army has traditionally approached the conduct of MOUT. It finds that current US MOUT doctrine can be traced directly back to the lessons learned in Europe in World War II. The Army has placed little emphasis on changing or updating MOUT doctrine since that time. Next, three case studies are presented that illustrate three types of urban conflict the US can expect to face in the future: combat against conventional forces, peacekeeping/peacemaking operations, and aid to civil authorities. The case studies used are: the American intervention in the Dominican Republic, 1965-1966; the Battle of Hue, Republic of Vietnam, 1968; and British operations in Belfast, Northern Ireland, 1969-1985. After reviewing these historical case studies the monograph examines the implications of planning a major urban operation in terms of creating an acceptable balance of aims, ways, means, and risks to provide the greatest chances of success for the operation. The use of other theoretical tools, such as center of gravity analysis, selecting lines of operation, and determining decisive points is also discussed. The monograph concludes that MOUT is a real and immediate threat for US forces. Doctrine, training, organizations, and equipment all need to be reexamined and refined to meet this threat. A failure to address these issues creates significant risks of increasing the eventual costs of future urban operations, and failing to accomplish the strategic goals of the United States.

ADA 300041 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)