This study examined what U.S. Army heavy brigades should accomplish when conducting reconnaissance during offensive operations, what they actually accomplish, and why there is a shortfall. Doctrinal literature from the capstone how to manual FM 100-5, Operations through FM 17-99, Scout Platoon establishes what brigade reconnaissance should accomplish. The 1987 RAND analysis, the 1988 CALL studies, NTC take-home packages from 1991-1993, the 1993 Tait Group papers and other DESERT STORM documents identify the discrepancy between expectation and performance. The 1987 RAND study statistically correlated effective reconnaissance and successful offensive operations at the NTC. Reconnaissance during these operations was effective only 8 percent of the time. When reconnaissance was effective, offensive operations succeeded 70 percent of the time. The more assets the commander employed and the more time he gave the reconnaissance force to execute its tasks, the greater its chances for success. The 1988 CALL studies concluded that 25 percent of reconnaissance missions at the NTC were effective. Successful offensive operations followed effective reconnaissance greater than 80 percent of the time. These studies found that R&S plan timeliness and scout platoon survivability were directly proportional to reconnaissance success. The NTC trend from 1991 to 1993 reveals that the effective reconnaissance rate remains at 25 percent, but the correlation to successful offensive operations has risen to 90 percent. Commanders and staffs, especially S-2s, have problems in planning, preparing and supervising the execution of reconnaissance, partly explaining why it is not more effective. Commanders sometimes create ad hoc reconnaissance organizations under their control to improve results, but they generally lack cohesion and are difficult to sustain. Deficiencies in doctrine, organization, equipment and training contribute to the problems brigades have in-conducting effective reconnaissance. Doctrinal literature lacks detail, consistency, and realism. Task force scout platoons cannot use both aggressive and stealth reconnaissance techniques, see deep, and survive as currently organized and equipped. S-2 sections are too under-staffed in officers and soldiers to function efficiently. Institutional training for S- 2s does not prepare them for the rigors of their job. Finally, heavy brigades do not train adequately at home station to produce cohesive and effective reconnaissance forces. Commanders and staffs realize there is a causal relationship between effective reconnaissance and successful offensive operations. Despite this awareness, NTC and DESERT STORM performance demonstrates weaknesses in heavy brigade reconnaissance which can be attributed in some degree to the preceding deficiencies in doctrine, organization, equipment; and training. In light of these deficiencies, U.S. Army heavy brigades are today only marginally capable of conducting effective reconnaissance during offensive operations.

ADA 300985 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)