This monograph examines U.S. Joint doctrine for operational deception (Joint Pub 3-58: Joint Doctrine for Military Deception). The monograph provides information to operational planners on deception concepts that are unique to Joint doctrine and how these concepts can be used when planning operational deception. The monograph provides historical examples of operational deception by briefly examining deception operations in the Napoleonic Era, WWI, WWII, and the 1973 Yom Kippur War. The monograph compares unique Joint deception concepts with the deception operations performed by USCENTCOM in the Persian Gulf War. The monograph also compares Joint doctrine for operational deception with the earlier doctrines of the four U.S. Services. The monograph concludes that USCENTCOM's operational deception in the Persian Gulf War is in concordance with subsequent Joint doctrine. Based on historical examples, the monograph makes recommendations for planners to consider when planning for and conducting operational deception. The monograph suggests changes to Services' doctrine for military deception.

ADA 300711 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)