In Operations Other Than War (OOTW) U.S. forces will be involved in armed conflict in what are called, ironically, 'peace operations'. The three peace missions, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and peacemaking, are not a continuum in peace operations and hence the U.S. could find itself entering a situation where one type of peace operation can change quickly and unexpectedly to another type of peace mission. The U.S. has found itself entering into peace operations with questionable public support; the operation then takes a dramatic turn after perceived failure. The operations in Beirut and Somalia are both examples where light infantry vulnerabilities were used by hostile forces to change the course of strategy for the U.S. Each example occurred in urban areas, the hardest of all combat environments. In both cases the U.S. forces suffered large casualties; these casualties caused the American public to perceive the operations as failures and subsequently to demand that the NCA give the order to withdraw. The Gallup poll displays the ambivalence of the U.S. public prior to Beirut, Somalia and Haiti, then further shows the change from apathy to opposition in the OOTW after the incidents in Beirut and Somalia. Within the U.S. military the debate over the utility and practicality of the Light infantry division has not changed since the cold war period; however, a small part of the argument has changed. Although light infantry was designed to fight unaugmented in an urban area in a general war situation, the light infantry is unsuited to fight unaugmented in an urban area in an OOTW.

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