This study examines how successful the current heavy brigade fire support system is in facilitating the integration of close support indirect fires with maneuver. The research shows that the supply and demand sides of the current heavy brigade fire support system have many inherent weaknesses that inhibit the integration of indirect fires with maneuver. The major weakness of the system is found on the demand side. Institutional training of maneuver officers is not producing combined arms officers. Additionally, artillerymen are not being trained to understand maneuver doctrine or how to integrate effectively indirect fires with maneuver. Other weaknesses include, doctrinal-organizational disconnects and reality-doctrinal mismatches. Analysis of the system includes an examination of National Training Center heavy brigade rotations from 90-1 through 94-07. Additional research material consisted of an examination of the institutional training received by armor, infantry, and artillery officers. The heavy brigade fire support system was examined against the definition of close support fires, likely force projection battlefield environment, and types of indirect fires required by the heavy brigade in the expected environment.

ADA 293487 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)