The Army Global Prepositioning Strategy (GPS) officially became a Department of Defense endorsed program in 1993 as a means to rapidly project heavy army forces to critical regions around the world. The program calls for prepositioning heavy army combat equipment at various locations to show U.S. commitment and to reduce deployment timelines given the outbreak of a crisis. At first glance the strategy appears to be a well-conceived DoD power projection initiative. However, the program currently suffers from an incongruity between the strategic intent and operational and tactical capabilities. This monograph will examine the GPS to in an effort to determine its strengths, weaknesses, and to recommend modifications to address the shortcomings. The GPS review will examine five areas: the National Military Strategy relationship to prepositioning initiatives over time; the present GPS organization; a review of recent operational deployments involving employment of prepositioned equipment; issues affecting the efficacy of the GPS; and the anticipated nature of future warfare and its impact on the GPS. An analysis, conclusions and recommended GPS modifications will follow this initial examination. The Global Prepositioning Strategy is an integral part of the nation's national military strategy for the twenty-first century. However, potential problems exist in executing this strategy. An introspective, critical analysis of the program is a prudent course of action.

ADA 314930 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)