This monograph discusses how the division staff can become better organized and equipped for planning and controlling deep attacks, to increase mission effectiveness and speed coordination. The U.S. Army is experiencing this problem in organizing the division staff to plan and control operations involving the new long-range weapons that are organic to the division as well as those available from corps or joint headquarters. This monograph first examines how divisions conducted deep attacks during Operation Desert Storm, given the new capabilities of the enhanced-range weapons, such as the AH-64 Apache and the MLRS. It then discusses the new emphasis on deep attacks at the National Training Center and Battle Command Training Program to highlight problems in deep operations. Finally, this paper focuses on the preceding issues to argue that divisions need a standardized organizational structure to meet the requirements of planning deep attacks. The emerging doctrine gives the division commander latitude in determining how to form a Deep Operation Coordination Cell. This paper discusses the need for standardized organization and duties for a DOCC at a division.

ADA 309687 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)