This monograph examines doctrine for joint operations to determine if it helps speed planning and coordination for the employment of operational fires. The Joint Force Commander is experiencing the problem of centrally controlling operational fires with the difficulties posed by force projection and the overlapping deep battle capabilities of the service components. This paper first defines the concept of operational fires and makes several assumptions as to why the current doctrinal considerations may need to be updated. It then provides historical examples of the employment of operational firepower in the Normandy campaign in 1944 and in the Persian Gulf War in 1991. Finally, this monograph focuses on the preceding issues to argue that joint doctrine needs a standardized organization at the Joint Force Commander's level to meet the requirements of planning and coordinating the use of operational firepower. The recommendation is the formation of a Joint Operational Fires Cell at the theater level to provide the centralized joint staff agency as a standard staff section.

ADA 314901 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)