This monograph discusses the evolution of U.S. Army doctrine with respect to the organization of the Bradley-equipped mechanized infantry battalion. General William DePuy's powerful vision, as captured in the 1976 version of FM 100-5, Operations, set the Army on a modernization, training, and leadership path that dominated its concept of warfare for nearly twenty years. This monograph examines the ability of an organization expressly created to satisfy this vision to adapt to the addition of versatility to the Army's operational tenets. The 1976 through 1986 versions of FM 100-5 articulated the method by which the U.S. led NATO forces would defend Central Europe against a Soviet led mechanized attack. The equipment procurement, resourcing, and training focus of the Army remained predominantly focused on this threat, with minimal adjustments for other contingencies. The Army that emerged by 1990 was the physical embodiment of DePuy's initial vision, as refined by his disciples. However, just as the Army designed to meet this threat was fielded, the threat collapsed. In the 1993 version of FM 100-5, the Army's doctrinal response to the new strategic environment added versatility and Operations Other than War to its mission requirements. Overlaying a new doctrine on an existing force structure gave rise to numerous considerations. One result is a mismatch of the Bradley battalion's doctrinal focus and its organizational capabilities. The implications of this mis-match are manifested in the areas of training, employment, resources, and future doctrinal considerations. The bottom line is that the Bradley battalion organization is not versatile. It is limited by employment considerations and equipment constraints. In that sense, it does not fully support the current doctrine. This monograph makes one point absolutely clear: Doctrine and organization must consistently add up to a single, clear vision. The Bradley battalion is now suffering from a fractured vision. The Army needs a new unifying doctrinal vision. It requires an idea so powerful that it is able to re-establish the laser-like focus provided by General DePuy. Without this vision, the Army will attempt to achieve versatility despite the limitations imposed by its current weapons systems and force structure. To attempt to force an organization expressly designed for one purpose into the requirements of another without a clear sense of direction is akin to cutting the foot to fit the shoe. This is fraught with peril, as the next walk taken in the Army's proverbial new shoes may be terribly painful.

ADA 310291 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)