This monograph presents a concept for the employment of US Special Operations Forces in support of UN peace operations. Such operations are likely to continue for the foreseeable future and remain an important component of the National Security Strategy. Peace operations pose a significant dilemma for the national leadership due to the proliferation in missions, declining military resources, and domestic political opposition. This paper argues that US SOF can be a strategic economy of force allowing the US to remain engaged while conserving scarce resources. US SOF can contribute to UN operations by overcoming some of the inherent weaknesses in multi-national operations. The monograph discusses the changes in UN operations that have occurred since the end of the Cold War. It introduces the term "non-conventional conflict" to characterize the post-Cold War peace operations environment, an environment in which US SOF have operated throughout its history. Next, the monograph examines the critical military weaknesses in the categories of assessing, planning, training, and command and control that are inherent in multi-national UN operations. Finally it presents a concept using US SOF to offset these weaknesses by serving as a "trim tab," leveraging the skills gained through forty years of Unconventional Warfare (UW) and Foreign Internal Defense (FID) experience. To effectively support a UN mission, US SOF should revitalize the concept of the Special Action Force (SAF) developed during their early counterinsurgency experience in the 1960s. By applying the primary SOF function of organizing, training, advising, and assisting found in the principle SOF mission of FID, the SAF can be a force multiplier for a UN military organization, a US strategic economy of force, and make a contribution to the success of peace operations.

ADA 309828 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)