The purpose of this monograph is to evaluate international efforts at coercive diplomacy aimed at stopping the fighting in the former Yugoslavia between 1991 and 1995. According to Lawrence Freedman, Professor of War Studies at King's College, 'Since June 1991, the (UN) Security Council has adopted more than 60 resolutions and experimented with almost every available form of coercion short of war.' The first UN resolution to apply coercion, in the form of an arms embargo, was passed in September 1991 with approval of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 713. Though international consensus was achieved with this resolution there was no consensus on the specifics of enforcing these sanctions. For the next four years, EC, US and UN actions based on similar inconsistencies failed to bring the fighting in the former Yugoslavia to a halt. Using Sir James Cable's model of coercive diplomacy, this monograph examines why the efforts between 1991 and 1995 were ineffective and why in 1995, the international community was successful in bringing the warring factions to a diplomatic settlement. This paper concludes that, based on Cable's model, the international community failed to solve the conflict because it used the least effective form of coercive diplomacy. When the international community finally agreed upon a course of action and implemented it with purposeful coercion, the warring parties agreed to work out a diplomatic settlement and produced the Dayton Accords. Implementation of this accord is being enforced by NATO combat forces in the former Yugoslavia, and indications are that their efforts are meeting with success.

ADA 314352 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)