This monograph examines the U. S. military capability to defend strategic airlift aircraft against current and projected threats in humanitarian assistance operations. The size of the Joint Task Force (JTF) is frequently restricted by political, material, and environmental considerations. Consequently, the JTF commander must consider developing a Time Phased Force Deployment Data List that provides force protection for the airlift force that meets the possible threats and responds to mission constraints. Recent studies suggest two trends: (1) the military airlift aircraft are not equipped to handle the threat, and (2) the JTF must also provide protection to those aircraft flown by Non-Governmental Relief Organizations (NGOs) and the CRAF. This monograph is divided into five sections. Section one, the introduction, establishes the purpose of the study and the significance of the research question to the US military: Are planned air defense measures adequate to defend airlift forces against hostile threats during OOTW? Section two examines the present threat to strategic airlift aircraft in the OOTW environment and concludes that the man-portable surface-to-air missile is the ideal weapon to attack the airlift bridge at the airfields. Section three analyzes current National, Service and Joint doctrines for their force protection requirements and responsibilities of the airlift force in the humanitarian assistance environment. Doctrine recognizes the importance of airlift, but does not provide air defense to the entire airlift force, civilian aircraft are not included in this protection. Section four reviews recent military experiences during Operations RESTORE HOPE, in Somalia, and SUPPORT HOPE, in Rwanda. The force protection lessons learned during Somalia were ignored in Rwanda. Relying on only self-defense assets of strategic airlift aircraft is not the correct approach during humanitarian assistance missions. The final section answers the research question and offers recommendations for improving protection for airlift forces for future humanitarian relief operations. The U.S. currently does not provide adequate measures to defend all the airlift forces against man-portable surface-to-air missiles during humanitarian relief missions. Each service views the threat differently and offers separate approaches to handle the threat. Joint doctrine provides guidance to the Joint Task Force but explains neither how to follow the doctrine with the constraints and limitations imposed on the force during a relief mission nor how to protect the NGO's aircraft. However, there are available some reasonable means to correct this situation. The Air Force must create an integrated electronic warfare master plan, to include airlift forces for relief missions. JTFs should employ unmanned aerial vehicles with EW pods to provide continuous protection for all airlift forces in the theater. And Joint doctrine should be followed in establishing base defense operations centers and patrols to secure the MODS and their air LOCS from attack.

ADA 309934 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)