This monograph maintains that the military acting alone can never achieve a comprehensive solution to a crisis situation. For success, the military must work in conjunction with diplomats, politicians, and humanitarians. The monograph begins by comparing the organizational culture of the military with that of politics, diplomacy, and humanitarian aid. Two case studies, Bosnia and Somalia, are used to illustrate the differences in organizational cultures, and to provide lessons for planners on how to overcome these differences. Both case studies describe the missions of the military, politicians, diplomats and humanitarians. Also, the case studies describe how the different organizations interact. The monograph concludes that the various agencies can successfully interact. Further, the monograph offers some concrete techniques for future military planners that must assume a mission from an existing, robust, US led force. Specifically, the lessons learned that are discussed in this monograph are applicable to a force which would replace the Interim Force (FOR) in Bosnia. Finally, the monograph concludes with broader lessons for military planners. These lessons provide a method for including non-military agencies into military planning. The method outlined is a step by step description on how to successfully integrate these agencies at the operational level.

ADA 314394 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)