This monograph examines the capabilities of the heavy division (Armor and Mechanized Infantry Division) G2 and ACE to conduct collection management operations. It focuses on emerging ACE/ASAS concept of operations to determine if this system of systems provides the necessary capabilities to conduct synchronized collection in a dynamic, information based combat environment. The foundation of this study, Section II, surveys intelligence collection management and dissemination doctrine. FM 34-2, Collection Management and Synchronization Planning, the primary doctrinal manual in this area, provides a clear understanding of the distinct sub-functions of CM: Requirements Management, Mission Management, and Asset Management. Since collection management doctrine, as defined in FM 34-2, has not changed since 1990, this provides a common framework for analyzing the CM system from DS/DS to present. Section III draws heavily on the OPERATION DESERT SHIELD /DESERT STORM after action reports and historical archives to identify the primary strengths and weaknesses in the intelligence CM&D system during the last major conflict involving U. S. heavy divisions. An analysis of these reports furnishes detailed information on the specific aspects of CM operations and the impact on the intelligence operations of the division. This section includes recommendations for system improvements made by the commanders and staffs of the heavy divisions based on their DESERT STORM combat experiences. Section IV assesses the evolving application of Collection Management doctrine by selected heavy divisions since the Gulf War. The Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) Final Exercise Reports (FERs) from 1991 through 1995 provide a contemporary basis for analysis of the CM system. This segment also includes a study of the doctrinal requirements for CM operations as well as the specific capabilities of the ACE CM personnel and equipment. By carefully analyzing the units' Tactical Standard Operating Procedures and their use of ASAS in tactical and training operations, it is possible to determine how well the ACE supports the CM requirements of the commander. This analysis reviews the equipment capabilities, particularly within the ACE structure; and it addresses the internal/external operations of the ACE and the impact of the ACE structure on CM&D operations. A comprehensive evaluation of heavy division CM&D operations should produce lessons that will assist tactical planners and G2s in improving the effectiveness of their intelligence systems. Section V outlines conclusions, including identified strengths and shortfalls in the ACEIASAS structure, and will provide recommendations for possible improvements in the CM system. These conclusions and recommendations, based on an analysis of the heavy division CM capabilities, draw heavily on input from G2s and intelligence officers in the heavy divisions and BCTP observer/controller staff.

ADA 309837 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)