In a theater of operations, Army access to airspace not under its direct control is difficult to obtain. The increasing number of intelligence, aviation, and long range fires systems organic to the Army, that require the routine use of airspace above the coordination altitude and beyond the fire support coordination line (FSCL), require greater and easier access to airspace usually controlled by the joint forces air component commander (JFACC). Without this access, critical intelligence collection requirements go unanswered, and Army aircraft readiness rates are lowered because of limitations to test flights and the slower delivery of repair parts. The processes and procedures that do exist are the result of after thought and workarounds. Doctrine dealing with the issue is vague and sometimes contradictory. An examination airspace command and control in a wartime theater of operations is undertaken using the Training and Doctrine Command's (TRADOC) doctrine, training, leadership development, organization, material, and soldiers (DTLOMS) model. The doctrinal evaluation includes a review of Army, joint and Air Force publications dealing with requests for Army use of airspace not under its direct control. Key players and their responsibilities are identified upon creation of a joint task force (JTF), and the subsequent appointment of a JFACC. Deficiencies in training, leadership development, organization, material, and soldier utilization are discussed as they apply to the current A C and battlefield coordination element (BCE) structures. A2C2 lessons learned and recently published periodicals are examined from operations JUST CAUSE, DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, and from joint exercises since then. The difficulty Army assets experience accessing joint airspace is well documented and, for the most part, remains unchanged. The difficulties and general lack of familiarity with joint airspace control procedures, and the mission orientation of Army aviation units, has driven them to occasionally ignore the process, increasing the risk of accidents and fratricide. Much of the challenge may be attributed to voids in joint and Army command and control doctrines resulting from service cultural and philosophical differences. Those differences stymie attempts at resolution and perpetuate the cycle of reinventing temporary workarounds at the beginning of every new joint operation and exercise. Finally, recommendations are made that could help reduce the problem, with a more permanent solution requiring the addition of jointness as a basic tenet of Army operations.

ADA 314281 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)