This monograph examines the utility of long-range surveillance human intelligence as part of a larger intelligence gathering system. The paper proposes that even with the acquisition of high-technology intelligence gathering systems, such as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) and the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), Long-Range Surveillance Units (LRSU) are still an essential part of the system. LRSU do have significant problems associated with their employment currently. The most significant problems are communications equipment, doctrine and organization. These elements limit LRSU effectiveness now and in the future within the framework of FORCE XXI operations. This monograph contains seven sections: introduction, history of LRSU, the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), LRSU doctrine, FORCE XXI operations, LRSU for FORCE XXI, and conclusion. The history section sheds light on the origins of the LRSU mission through World War II, Korea, Vietnam and the 9th Infantry Division test unit of the early 1980's. The section on the RMA examines the problems with LRSU equipment, specifically communications, and how the RMA may affect it. It also examines the future viability of the UAV and JSTARS as examples of advanced technology made possible by the RMA. The fourth section, LRSU doctrine, reveals its origins and the revision of the doctrine in 1992. It establishes the base line for future challenges for LRSU within FORCE XXI. The FORCE XXI section explains the characteristics of those operations and how LRSU are and are not prepared to support them. The LRSU for FORCE XXI section details how present companies and detachments can be combined into battalion level organizations to solve the problems associated with supporting future operations. The conclusion provides a synthesis of the problems facing LRSU and the solutions to enable them to effectively support FORCE XXI operations. The monograph concludes that LRSU, and forerunner units of this type, have suffered because of a traditional dislike of elite units, rapid demobilization, and the failure to capture doctrinal lessons learned. The current RMA can provide solutions to the problems associated with LRSU communications. Additionally, the paper concludes that the U.S. Army intelligence gathering system still needs LRSU, despite the promise of UAVs and JSTARS. Finally, the study concludes that LRSU doctrine is flawed in its present form and to fix it requires the reorganization of existing companies and detachments into battalion level structures. If these proposals are implemented, LRSU will continue to be a vital part of the intelligence gathering system.

ADA 310299 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)