This monograph examines whether infantry small units, trained and equipped solely for war, can successfully conduct operations other than war (OOTW). Many military professionals argue that units trained for war can readily adapt to OOTW. Yet, other professional soldiers and military experts believe that OOTW requires unique capabilities which normal war fighting training alone does not provide. The trend toward ethnic and regional unrest has characterized the world security environment since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. As a result, the number and frequency of peacekeeping and other OOTW in recent history has increased. In light of these changes and emerging US Army peacekeeping doctrine the issue of training units for OOTW missions has gained in importance. Initially the monograph describes both the arguments for, and against, training units specifically for OOTW, and describes US Army OOTW and training doctrine. The monograph examines selected small unit actions in four separate OOTW from 1989 to 1995. The case studies include operations Just Cause (Panama), Restore Hope and UNOSOM II (Somalia), Able Sentry (Macedonia), and Restore Democracy (Haiti). Infantry rifle company, platoon, and squad actions in these historical examples provide the data for the analysis to determine if training units for war adequately prepared them for OOTW. Examination of the case studies includes comparisons between the unit's war-time training, changes to their normal training in preparation for the operation, and the actual tactics the units used to accomplish their mission. The monograph examines the unit's training and analyzes the impact of that training on the unit's ability to successfully accomplish its mission. The monograph concludes that infantry small units require specialized training, beyond traditional combat training, in order to effectively conduct OOTW. The need for restraint in OOTW fundamentally changes the ways small units operate and the means they need to accomplish their mission. Implications discussed in the conclusions include an analysis of the Army's fundamental training concepts, institutional education system, and organization.

ADA 309927 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)