This monograph examines US Army doctrine for the conduct of Area Security. It concludes that current doctrine is ineffective and should be changed to prevent needless casualties in future conflicts. The monograph examines the threat to US forces across the spectrum of conflict from MOOTW to High Intensity Conflict. It determines that the most likely threat to US forces will be small groups of light infantry operating against US Combat Support and Combat Service Support units. Next the monograph examines the current doctrine for conducting area security. It determines that the doctrine is inadequate in that it does not provide for building the required combat power to defeat the expected threat. The monograph finds that despite the demise of the Soviet threat, rear operations are still given subordinate status to the close and deep fight. The doctrine does not provide adequate mobility, firepower, protection or leadership to either the support units, the response forces or the tactical combat force. Last, the monograph suggests possible methods of correcting these deficiencies. These methods include first properly resourcing support units so that they can defeat a level I threat by themselves. Next the monograph discusses forming a dedicated Area Security Force to support the CS and CSS units as they conduct rear operations. The Area Security Force would be a combined arms organization that is analogous to a Cavalry Regiment. The Area Security force would provide a single organization and chain of command to replace both the MP units which form the level II response force and the TCF which is the level III response force.

ADA 324336 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)