Since the demise of the Soviet Union, the United States has faced increasing pressure from other countries to take the lead in resolving regional conflicts. As a result, much debate has occurred on determining when to enter a conflict and not much thought is often given to how to end conflicts. The cost-benefit calculation model is considered by many scholars to be a standard by which modern states determine when to conclude a conflict. Simply stated, state's leaders will pursue their objectives until a point is reached where the costs exceed the benefit or war aims. The theory stems from the writings of Clausewitz. The monograph examines whether the cost-benefit model for war termination is sensitive to conditions of the military and domestic situations, economic conditions, and expectations of external assistance. The monograph begins by explaining the model and the many factors that affect the model. The factors include internal power struggles, public opinion, domestic politics, and the affect of casualties on the war effort. Three case studies are then analyzed to determine why war goes beyond the obvious cost-benefit calculation. Germany's actions during World War I, Japan's decisions in World War II, and the United States policies in Vietnam provide the basis of analysis. All historical examples examined exemplify that the country's use of the cost-benefit model was not sensitive to the military, domestic, and economic conditions as well as the expected external assistance. The paper concludes by stating that although the model use was not sensitive to the examined conditions, the model still provides an acceptable framework in which to consider war termination.

ADA 331321 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)