Optimizing attack helicopter maneuver using naval vessels as a force projection platform.
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Optimizing attack helicopter maneuver using naval vessels as a force projection platform.
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In an effort to rethink how the Army fights, the 1993 FM 100-5 Operations, recognizes the fact that the Cold War has ended and the strategy of the United States has changed. The Army's doctrine reflects a shift to stronger joint operations and incorporates a myriad of changes to include a new Army tenet - Versatility. The versatility of the Longbow attack helicopter battalion is inherent in its ability to deploy from naval vessels, ingress landfall with the purpose of destroying a priority target or group of targets and return to that vessel. This adds a new dimension to Apache warfighting. This monograph takes a look at old facts through new glasses, then makes use of those facts in order to become more innovative and effective in the employment of a Longbow attack helicopter battalion. An unclassified independent deep attack scenario in Korea against a moving second echelon armor brigade is the focus of this monograph. The deep attack scenario provides a basis for original analysis to evaluate whether or not a Longbow attack helicopter battalion can conduct successful independent deep operations in the Korean context, using naval vessels as a force projection platform. This monograph examines three separate but related areas necessary for a Longbow attack helicopter battalion to execute successfully one type of deep attack, the ambush. It looks at the type of naval vessels that can support a Longbow attack helicopter battalion, the availability of those vessels, as well as what a CINC gains or loses by using these vessels as launch and/or pickup platforms. It also examines the ability of a Longbow battalion to penetrate a North Korean first echelon division air defense system (direct approach) and maneuver 125 kilometers from the FLOT to arrive with sufficient combat power to destroy a second echelon armor brigade compared to employing a coastal penetration (indirect approach) to arrive with sufficient combat power to destroy the same threat in the same engagement area. Finally, it looks at the technical capability of a Longbow battalion to detect, designate, and destroy a second echelon armor brigade in the Korean context. The monograph concludes that a Longbow attack helicopter battalion can conduct successful independent deep operations using naval vessels as launch and/or pickup platforms. There are three classes of the big-deck amphibious assault ships that can support a longbow battalion; five are promulgated for planning in a major regional contingency such as Korea. Use of the indirect approach (the ability to use unexpected or advantageous air routes) provides increased survivability to the Longbow battalion which is inherent in conserving the fighting potential of a force. In examining the ability of a Longbow battalion to detect, designate, and destroy a North Korean second echelon armor brigade, the monograph concludes that the technical capability of the Longbow system greatly increases the ability to detect and designate a target; however, the Longbow battalion has the capability to defeat an armor brigade, but not destroy it.
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