In an effort to rethink how the Army fights, the 1993 FM 100-5 Operations, recognizes the fact that the Cold War has ended and the strategy of the United States has changed. The Army's doctrine reflects a shift to stronger joint operations and incorporates a myriad of changes to include a new Army tenet - versatility. The versatility of an aviation task force is inherent in its ability to deploy from naval vessels, ingress landfall with the purpose of conducting major operations (asymmetrical and symmetrical). This monograph examines the desirability and feasibility of an aviation task force, using naval vessels as a force projection platform, to support operational objectives. The analysis begins with a historical review of adapting aviation forces to different environments. Lessons learned from the past can provide valuable insights into the types of major operations that an aviation task force can conduct in the future. This monograph examines three separate but related areas necessary for an aviation task force to conduct operations from the sea. A discussion of the types of major operations will follow the historical survey of adaptive aviation forces. Employment of aviation task forces and sustainment issues follow. The monograph concludes that an aviation task force can conduct successful major operations (asymmetrical and symmetrical) using naval vessels as launch and/or pickup platforms. Basing an aviation task force on the deck of naval vessels extends operational reach and gives the joint task force commander another 'sword' to deliver a symmetrical or asymmetrical attack against the enemy. An aviation task force conducting operations from naval vessels is protected by the 'shield' of the joint task force until it is ready to deliver its blows against the enemy. The concept of operating an aviation task force from amphibious assault ships is a force multiplier with great potential for future contingency applications.

ADA 331336 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)