Throughout the history of warfare, there have been periods when technological developments have dramatically; albeit temporarily, affected the balance between firepower and maneuver on the tactical battlefield. Recent advances in information age technology have stimulated a renewal of the argument for an 'ascendancy of fires.' This idea envisions military forces that would rely primarily upon long range precision fires to defeat an enemy before ground maneuver forces make contact. The military has entered a new period of dialogue focusing on the proper balance between firepower and maneuver. The time is right for the United States Army to reexamine these new capabilities and determine the optimum balance between firepower and maneuver for the ground force of the next century. This monograph examines historical tactics and doctrine from World War I and the U.S. Army's Pentomic Era to determine why these previous attempts to rely primarily on firepower failed. The monograph then explores current concepts that seek to employ information age technology to enable long range precision fires to destroy enemy forces while using maneuver forces to exploit firepower's success. A survey of potential vulnerabilities within this type of tactic assists in ascertaining the viability of an ascendancy of fires. Finally, this monograph determines if any of the historical reasons for failure of firepower ascendancy are still relevant for future information age, high intensity warfare. This monograph concludes that emerging technology may indeed enable America's Army to effectively employ long range precision fires. However, historical situations, wherein dominating firepower occurred without effective ground maneuver, indicate that firepower alone is insufficient to lead to decisive victory. Long-range precision fires could be an integral part of the Force XXI Army, but should not be the principle element. If economically feasible, the Army should continue to leverage emerging technology to improve the long-range fire support system. However, the US Army should maintain its current balance of combat power in which firepower and maneuver complement one another on the battlefield.

ADA 324342 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)