This monograph asserts that, contrary to what current doctrine implies and in order to enhance unity of effort at execution, strategic and operational level commanders and planners must plan Peace Operations and Humanitarian Assistance using deliberate planning procedures and in coordination with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other agencies. This paper also urges a holistic view of complex humanitarian crises so that commanders and planners can better see how a limited military response functionally relates to the broader response of NOOs and other agencies. The monograph first explores the nature of NGOs and complex humanitarian crises. It then reviews joint doctrine to determine what doctrine prescribes/ describes with respect to planning for and operating with NGOs during Peace Operations and Humanitarian Assistance. Lastly, the monograph reviews four post Cold War operations other than war for pertinent lessons learned. The monograph concludes that the Armed Forces can indeed leverage NGO capabilities as long as they adopt a holistic view of complex humanitarian crises: one that recognizes the many factors that contribute to a degenerative process that occurs over time, one that portrays how the finite capabilities of many different organizations some of which are NGOs, can be complimentary and lead to the resolution of an otherwise infinite problem and one that encourages anticipatory planning and inter-agency preparation.

ADA 331167 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)