This monograph investigates a gap in U.S. Army doctrine on the prevention of terrorist attacks. First, this monograph shows that the goals, organization, and tactics of terrorist are a formidable threat to the Army. Second, it uses case studies from Great Britain and France to show that well trained and dedicated terrorists can bypass heightened security; and that terrorism is difficult, if not impossible to deter at the time and point of attack. Third, it uses case studies from Beirut and Saudi Arabia to show how U.S. policy can be affected by, terrorism, and to find what measures could been implemented by military commanders to deter those attacks. This monograph found that in both Beirut and Saudi Arabia, terrorist activity indicators were spotted prior to these attacks, but were neither recognized nor reported. This monograph concludes that because the Army is becoming increasingly involved in situations similar to those of Beirut and Saudi Arabia, it presents a correspondingly more lucrative target for terrorism. Further, because terrorism is a threat to U.S. national policy, the Army must develop a doctrine to integrate the soldier into the fight against terrorism before the attack occurs. This new doctrine must increase the soldier's situational awareness of activities around him and educate him as to where and how to report these observations. Only then will the Army take steps in the direction of reducing soldier vulnerability in an increased terrorist threat environment.

ADA 325201 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)