This monograph suggests that Army doctrine does not support Joint doctrine in the direct approach to attacking the enemy's operational centers of gravity (COGs). It expresses the belief that there are phases of an operation in which air power should become the main effort, and ground forces the supporting effort. The doctrinal concepts listed in Joint doctrine have the potential to produce decisive victory, at a considerably lower cost than existing or proposed Army doctrine. The doctrines of the Air Force and Navy have influenced Joint doctrine's position in favor of the direct approach, and in using air or sea power as the main effort in some phases of the campaign for achieving operational objectives. Potential enemies in the MPC regions are vulnerable to operations involving U.S. and coalition militaries' ability to dominate the air and sea dimensions, in consonance with amphibious and/or vertical turning movements. The tremendous loss of life, and destruction of infrastructure so prevalent in ground intensive warfare, impedes the NSS goals of security, and prosperity. Ground intensive wars that attack and maneuver through a series of decisive points, and then on to the COGs themselves, tend to take longer and wreak greater destruction. The existing conflict between Army doctrine and Joint doctrine holds at risk the nation's commitment to fight and win two regional conflicts, near simultaneously, as expressed in the NSS and NMS.

ADA 331149 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)