The purpose of this monograph is to consider the proposal put forth in Douglas A. Macgregor's study Breaking the Phalanx: A New Design for Landpower in the 21st Century. In short, the paper's research question asks, should the Army adopt a Macgregor-Style group-based force structure during the next decade or maintain the current Army thrust line? This means attempting to determine if the Army should eliminate the divisional echelon and make a group and corps/joint task force structure the force building blocks of the future. In answering this question the following approach is used: First, the author explains the background and significance of the problem and provides a set of criteria which will be used in making determinations concerning future force structure decisions. The criteria are interoperability, deployability, efficiency, commandability, lethality, agility, and versatility. Second, the paper presents the major components of Macgregor's proposal and maps out the Army's current direction. This section of the paper answers the subordinate research question: What are the major force structure alternatives and how do they differ? Third, the paper examines two recent operations, Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM and UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. This answers a second subordinate research question: What lessons possibilities pertinent to the force structure decision have been offered by recent combat operations? This provides insights into the importance and characteristics of the traits selected as decision criteria and how they are manifested in actual operations. Fourth, the paper defines the thrust of future warfighting requirements in terms of the established criteria. This answers the final subordinate research question: What are the future warfighting requirements to which force design decisions must respond? This provides insights into how the traits established as criteria are seen in the future and their relationship to this issue. Last, based on the preceding discussion, the primary research question is answered (Should the Army adopt a Macgregor-style group-based force structure during the next decade or maintain the current Army thrust line?) through comparison and analysis of the two directions in light of the criteria. The conclusion is that the Army should not adopt Macgregor's proposal. The current Force XXIprocess is working and should continue its efforts into the near future. However, the Army should examine modifying Mure force structure and Force XXI experimentation toward consideration of a group-type proposal.

ADA 357286 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)