The purpose of this monograph is to examine the tactical mobility of the light infantry force and answer the following research question: Based on recent experiences and future anticipated requirements and constraints, does the light infantry company require HMMWVs to provide increased tactical mobility? Focus was on answering the following three questions, ultimately answered positively in the monograph: * Does the Light Infantry Company need enhanced tactical mobility? * Does the HMMWV fit the bill? * At company-level? The basic arguments presented examine the requirements of the past and future and compare them to the capabilities of the light infantry force of today and tomorrow. This technique seeks to determine if the means, or capabilities, are sufficient to achieve the ends, or requirements. The effort, since it concerns a force development issue, must examine past, present, and future requirements and capabilities to determine if the need for change truly does exist. The criteria for analysis include: speed and relative mobility, ability to move units and equipment, versatility and agility, force preservation, force structure, cost, and strategic mobility. Operations since 1985, when the first LID stood up, are examined as was the purpose for the LID and its current mobility capabilities. Examination of the future included the impact of the strategic context and evolving U.S. Army doctrine, or Force XXI operations; the latest edition of FM 100-5; and the programmed force modernization of the infantry force, especially Land Warrior. The author's conclusion is that based on recent experiences and future anticipated requirements, the U.S. Army should assign HMMWVs to light infantry companies to alleviate a serious shortfall in tactical mobility. If undertaken, this move also provides several other benefits examined in the monograph, including lethality, protection, and communications.

ADA 339420 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)