The purpose of this paper is to examine the operational impact of the INF treaty and what it means for the future of NATO. At this writing, there is considerable debate going on as to whether or not the US Congress should ratify the INF treaty. The political issues are well known and under careful examination. A critical element which still needs to be addressed is the operational impact of the INF treaty. This area may have been neglected because nuclear weapons are viewed primarily as an element of deterrence. Therefore, their warfighting potential is given only minimal consideration. This paper begins with a discussion of the historical use of nuclear weapons in NATO's defensive Alliance. It follows through to the decision in 1979 to modernize NATO's nuclear force. This decision resulted in the deployment of the Pershing II and ground launched cruise missile (GLCM) systems in Europe. The Soviet warfighting concept for Europe is addressed next to place the intermediate-range nuclear forces in their proper perspective. This is followed by a discussion on the operational implications of the INF treaty. The paper concludes by briefly mentioning a few of the 'defensive' proposals for the post-INF period. This paper concludes that the INF treaty is not the panacea of arms control/reduction which so many want it to be. The treaty is, in fact, an operational error. We will find there is not a viable system or defensive posture which can replace the warfighting capabilities provided by the intermediate-range nuclear forces. When the decision was made in 1979 to modernize our nuclear forces there was an operational imperative for the Intermediate-range nuclear forces. We need to understand this and insure that we take appropriate measures to fill the gap in the continuum of response. For the NATO strategy of flexible response to be credible, it is essential to preserve adequate forces in the three mutually supporting legs of the NATO triad: conventional, theater nuclear and strategic nuclear forces.

ADA 195451 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)