The U.S. Army's stated power projection strategy demands a corps of five divisions that is tailorable, sustainable, and with airborne vertical insertion capability. The lead brigade must be on the ground by C+4, the lead division by C+12. Two heavy divisions (sealifted) arrive from CONUS by C+30, with the mix of armored, mechanized, or air assault units determined by the supported CINC, and relying in part on a fully supported heavy combat brigade from prepositioned stocks afloat. The full corps (five divisions and a Corps Support Command) closes by C+75. This goal was not met during the deployment to war in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iraq, beginning in August, 1991. That deployment took 205 days to close the force. However, since that war, steps have been taken to improve the United States strategic deployment capabilities through enhancement of the USTRANSCOMs strategic triad of airlift, sealift, and prepositioning assets, as well as through the Army Strategic Mobility Program (ASMP) improvement of deployment support infrastructure. The increased and improved fleets of shipping and aircraft, and the improvements to infrastructure will greatly assist in power projection from CONUS; however, it is not enough for the Army to meet it's ASMP goal of deploying a heavy corps in 75 days. The best that can be done in the next 5 to 10 years is closure in 120 days given current levels of resourcing.

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