This monograph examines the Iran-Iraq War from an operational perspective. This eight year war represents the Iraqi's only experience with successful operational maneuver. As such, it is likely that lessons learned, particularly in the final campaign where they synchronized successive battles, will shape their operational thinking for the foreseeable future. Should U.S. interests again be threatened by a revitalized Iraqi military, a thorough understanding of how they operated in this war will be relevant in assessing their future capabilities. This study proposes to answer the question: to what degree did the Iraqis conduct operational art in their prosecution of the Iran-Iraq War? Classical and contemporary theory are first examined to develop sound criteria for the identification of operational art. Four criteria are identified as representing the essence of good operational art. They include the ability to: 1) conduct joint operations, 2) execute synchronized, simultaneous and successive operations, 3) conduct operations across the breath of the theater, and 4) provide logistical support for distributed operations. Then the war is briefly reviewed to assist in placing elements of the analysis in their proper perspective. The analysis section then examines the historical evidence using the four criteria to answer the research question. This examination of Iraqi performance reveals little evidence of operational art early in the war. However, by their final campaign it is apparent that the Iraqis were practicing operational art. They were able to conduct joint operations, effectively integrating major army operations with navy, air force and guerrilla actions. Throughout the final campaign, operational synchronization was apparent. Multiple corps were employed to attain a combination of terrain and force oriented objectives. Finally, the operations were executed and supported across a broad, 700 kilometer front. While it is doubtful that Marshall Tukachevski, Soviet theorist, would have been dazzled by Iraqi operational art, he most certainly would have recognized some of his tenents in the Iraqi's final campaign. Like the evolution of operational art in the Soviet Union, Iraqi operational art will likely continue to develop.

ADA 240184 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)