In his book Breaking the Phalanx, Colonel Douglas A. Macgregor raises important questions as to the future role of land power in the national strategy of the United States. Despite directing much of his discussion toward current Army corps/division restructuring, Colonel Macgregor forwards numerous arguments against funding current naval forces and the advisability of investing in future sea-based power projection platforms. Likening modern day America to the Roman Empire, Colonel Macgregor argues that security for the United States lies not in sea power, but in forward based armies akin to modern Roman Legions. He offers that today's navies are extremely vulnerable to cruise missile technology and land-based air power, as was evidenced in the Battle for the Falklands. in particular, Colonel Macgregor presents the argument that land-based aircraft can largely supplant aircraft carriers, which today are simply too expensive and vulnerable to warrant further funding. In the end, Colonel Macgregor argues that the military budget could be cut by $147 billion, with $102 billion coming directly from the cancellation of both the Navy's Nimitz-class aircraft carrier construction and it's F/A-18E/F Super Hornet program. The money saved from such cancellations could then be more prudently invested in new technologies and a stronger land-based force structure. This monograph addresses the question: Do Colonel Macgregor's arguments as presented in Breaking the Phalanx regarding U.S. Naval Aviation, both in terms of fleet vulnerability and cost effectiveness, warrant the proposed restructuring of naval forces? In researching this question, the author presents a historical examination of the Battle of the Falklands, with lessons learned by the British applied, wherever possible, to U.S. naval forces today. Closely linked to this, the author examines the current cost/capabilities and future roles of CVBGs, seeking to answer questions regarding their survivability, their relationship to sealift assets, and their power projection capabilities ashore. This discussion leads directly to an analysis of cruise missile technology and its effects against ships at sea. Finally, Colonel Macgregor's arguments against sea-based air power and rejection of the F/A-18EF Super Hornet are investigated. In the end the author concludes that Colonel Macgregor's arguments pertaining to U.S. Naval Aviation, though well intended, miss the mark. Colonel Macgregor assumes that naval air exists for one purpose only: power projection over land. He ignores the fact that naval air exists to provide air superiority for naval fleets and sealift assets, and that power projection comes as a result of this air superiority. Colonel Macgregor never adequately addresses this fundamental aspect of naval warfare, indicating a lack of comprehension as to the importance of air superiority in wars at sea. Until an enormous space-based system capable of providing air superiority for ships at sea is fielded, aircraft carriers and their embarked air wings, despite their high costs. will remain vital naval warfare platforms.

ADA 357218 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)