Since the end of the Cold War the United States Army has found itself conducting more and more operations that fall under the category of "Military Operations Other Than War" (MOOTW). Additionally, our National Security Strategy states that these operations will become the most frequent challenge for the armed forces. As these operations usually entail diverse tactical actions directed towards achieving strategic objectives, the operational commander is forced to conduct this linkage with joint and multinational forces. The operational commander may also be forced to operate within less than desirable command structures often dictated by the United Nations or other multinational agencies. The focus of this study is on the potential challenges the operational or joint force commander might face when directing military actions in MOOTW. The U.S. involvement and contemporary definitions of MOOTW establishes the background for the case study of the UNOSOM I1 mission in Somalia. A discussion of the evolution and concept of operational art provides the framework to analyze the UNSOM I1 operation with respect to the eight elements of operational art identified by Dr. James Schneider. Finally, the study concludes that the U.S. military demonstrated operational art with some shortfalls. In the areas of command and control, unity of command, and operational vision, decisions made at the strategic level often impact negatively on the operational commander's ability to link the tactical actions to strategic objectives. Additionally, although Dr. Schneider defines his theory of operational art within the context of total war, his theory can be functionally applied to MOOTW as well.

ADA 356936 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)