Napoleon Bonaparte lost over 300,000 men in the Therian Peninsula combating the British Army and Navy, along with their Spanish and Portuguese allies, in the savage conventional and unconventional Peninsular War. This very important sub-theater of the Napoleonic Wars set the pre-conditions for the eventual defeat of the First French Empire. The Peninsular War served as a source of strategic consumption for the Grande Armee. Many scholars consider this significant loss of irreplaceable French combat power as an important contributing factor in Napoleon's defeat in Russia in 1812. It is my opinion that the successful allied defense of Cadiz served as a focal point for rising Spanish nationalism and exacerbated the effects of the 'Spanish ulcer' whose passionate resistance so debilitated the French Army. This rebuilding of recognized Spanish resistance against the French gave the Duke of Wellington a complementary center of gravity for allied civil and military resistance outside of Lisbon within the Therian Peninsula. This joint and combined military operation is unique in the annals of the Peninsular War. Outside of the British Isles, Cadiz was the only belligerent national capital city, stretching from frigid Moscow to semi-tropical Lisbon, that did not fall at some point to the Grande Armee. The age old rhetorical question, how does a shark which is supreme within its element of water, fight a tiger, which is conversely supreme on land? When using this analogy of comparing the combative prowess of the British Navy against the Grande Armee, the principal geographical forum which enabled the two military predators to pit their respective strengths against one another was the Spanish revolutionary capital of Cadiz on the Island of Leon. This struggle, which lasted some thirty months, saw the considerable sea power of Britain used against the formidable land power of France. Success in the Peninsular War proved crucial to the allied cause, and disastrous in turn, for the land locked French and their overextended Emperor. Britain's sole peninsular ally, Portugal, depended entirely upon Britain for her defense and gradual rebuilding of a credible military establishment. With the establishment of Cadiz as the new revolutionary capital of Spain in February 1810, the British government recognized the diplomatic, propaganda, and military value of having Spain as a second active ally in the war against Napoleon in the Peninsula. Wellington correctly deduced his government's reaction and so spearheaded the logistical and military rescue of Cadiz before receiving British government approval. Although Wellington's military position was almost desperate, he recognized the importance of protecting the 'potential value' of Cadiz. Taking a risk, Wellington diverted badly needed supplies, specie, manpower, and sea power to Cadiz to enable the fledging Spanish government to survive. This logistical rescue provided the infant Spanish government immediate military protection and necessary means for survival with the collapse of the regular Spanish armies in Andalusia.

ADA 340332 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)