The 1740 strategic Siege of St. Augustine, Florida offers an excellent historical example of a flawed joint operation. Although it occurred in colonial North America over two centuries ago, the difficulties the British encountered in this joint operation can still provide germane insights for today's operational planner. Naval power played a key role in Britain's eventual decision to declare war on Spain. Britain possessed over 120 ships of the line while Spain could only assemble forty. Such an overmatch in British sea power was tempered in the knowledge that should France align with Spain, an additional fifty ships of the line and a large land army could enter into the struggle. Britain's administration realistically understood that facing Spain or France on the continent with her small army was ludicrous. However, a naval war would be an entirely different matter. Spain's New World colonies were at the end of a vulnerable line of communication (LOC) and should Britain muster sufficient military forces, then the seizure of Spain's most important ports would be possible through joint military operations. With control of the ports and markets, Britain would garner considerable commercial and military riches at Spain's expense. General James Oglethorpe, founder of the British colony of Georgia and semi-professional soldier, was able to convince the South Carolina Legislature and the Royal Navy Acting Commodore, Captain Vincent Pearce, (the on station naval commander), to assist him in capturing the Castillo de San Marcos at St. Augustine. If the British were successful, then all of Florida might become a British possession and dramatically change the political stage of North America Oglethorpe did not succeed in taking St. Augustine for a variety of reasons. One of the causes cited for the joint force's failure was the alleged inaction or malingering of the naval arm. This monograph will examine the joint aspects of this failed campaign, analyze the methodology of the opposing commanders, provide a balanced narrative of the expedition, and finally prove that the Royal Naval squadron did a credible job in assisting the land component in attaining its campaign objective and was not the proximate cause of the expedition's failure.

ADA 340053 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)