The purpose of this monograph is to examine the logistical transportation gap in the tactical segment of the U.S. Army distribution system of the Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) and to provide recommendations for future capabilities and requirements necessary to reduce the current logistical transportation gap. The U.S. Army has struggled with logistical distribution at all levels since the Revolutionary War. This logistical distribution problem often leads to culmination or tactical pauses of an operation. The loss of capability or freedom of action due to logistics results from the inability to distribute supplies at the far end of the logistical supply chain, the last 1,000 yards. The Army historically has overcome logistical gaps by temporarily supplementing additional capabilities or resources to solve the immediate problem - essentially playing a shell game. As the Army transforms to a campaign quality force with an expeditionary capability, these shell games will no longer enable the desired effectiveness of the Modular Force. The methodology of this monograph consists of establishing critical components of the distribution gap through a historical lens and following these components through the transition of doctrine from the current Legacy Force to the emerging Modular Force. The identified critical components of the logistical transportation gap are transportation platforms, labor forces, and materiel handling equipment. The evaluation of these transportation pillars against the desired capabilities of the Modular Force forms the basis of the solution set required to address the logistical transportation gap. This monograph finds the IBCT's logistical transportation gap to be expanding not contracting under the emergent design of the Modular Force's logistical distribution system. To reverse this expansion process and bridge the logistical transportation gap, the proposed solution set incorporates changes across the spectrum of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, and personnel in terms of the identified transportation pillars. The solution set recommendations include providing separate transportation assets to fulfill the maneuver transportation requirement; reorganizing the existing logistical transportation assets into combat capable organizations; increasing the personnel in each organized transportation unit to supplement the requirement for a dedicated labor force; and adding commercially available materiel handling equipment to each reorganized transportation unit to eliminate the requirement for a large labor force. Additionally, this paper considers the potential risks and criticism of the solution set and the solution set's potential integration with other emerging concepts.

Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)