A historical case study concerning the Israeli Army's response to the Palestinian "Intifada" or uprising in the late 1980's and early 1990's provides instructive planning considerations for likely future application of U.S. military force in an asymmetrical threat environment. The monograph specifically analyzes the time period from the beginning of the uprising until the handshake of Rabin and Arafat on the White House lawn September 13, 1993. Although the theoretical application of the case study is speculative of future environments, this paper attempts to link available historical data to anticipated trends in the international security environment and emerging concepts of operational art. The argument surrounding asymmetrical types of warfare leads into a discussion of the application of IDF lessons learned that may be applied to future U.S. military scenarios. Areas of analysis include: (1) Background, nature and growth of the Intifada Palestinian uprising; (2) The Israeli civil-military relationship; (3) The effectiveness of tactical coercion methods employed by the IDF in its efforts to use conventional military force in an unconventional manner (including the linkage, or lack of it, between strategic ends, operational level army planning and tactical training/execution within an asymmetrical environment); and (4) Applicable lessons that might be drawn from the IDF experience. Specific conclusions include: (1) Recognition of the difficulty of fighting a protracted asymmetrical conflict, (2) Likelihood of American forces facing a similar threat in the future, (3) Limitations of military coercion - particularly in representative democracies, (4) Military force superiority can be offset by protracted commitment and nationalistic sentiment, (5) Successful campaign strategies depend on inclusion of all instruments of power available to the nation - particularly the use of diplomatic leverage, (6) Point of diminishing returns on technological solutions in an unconventional or asymmetrical environment, and (7) Need for operational planning and integration for operations other than war.

ADA 357092 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)