This monograph explores the subject of organizational learning with a particular emphasis on how military units learn in combat. The challenges of today's joint operating environment require groups of soldiers to adapt responsively to a wide array of difficult and sometimes unfamiliar tasks. These efforts to improve unit performance often occur in the middle of an operation and thus involve a quick adjustment of behavior under taxing circumstances. Some scholars promote the concept of "learning organizations" and suggest that, because of the special qualities they possess, such entities have the ability to learn and succeed in situations where others fall short. This is an attractive notion for leaders seeking transformation for their organizations, but it is not free from ambiguity. What accounts for episodes of failure in organizations that seem to learn regularly on other occasions? This study argues that the process of learning demands a deeper explanation, especially when it takes place in the complex environment of combat. Focused on a topic of chief importance to military leaders, this monograph examines organizational learning through a case study that considers one unit over the course of a six-month operation. In combat with the Japanese on the Philippine island of Luzon from February to July 1945, the soldiers of the 112th Cavalry Regiment faced a resourceful enemy whose resistance challenged them across a broad spectrum of conditions. How did the unit learn in these circumstances, and what factors facilitated the process? When elements of the regiment failed to learn, what accounted for that failure? Throughout the 112th's performance on Luzon, evidence of adaptation is not difficult to find. Harder to discern are the details behind how its officers and men arrived at those improvements. By mining a rich collection of primary sources - including daily unit journals, after action reports, diaries, memoirs, and interviews - this study sheds light on the process of learning under fire. While learning in a complex environment does not happen by chance, neither do military units in combat learn according to a prescribed or uniform pattern. Learning occurs differently at the multiple levels of an organization and even varies among separate parts of the same level. Moreover, certain conditions enhance or inhibit the process as it transpires. Prior experience plays an ambivalent role. Soldiers innovate by using familiar tools in new ways or by moving a short step beyond what they have done in the past to develop helpful tactics or techniques. On the other hand, experience may lead to the formation of biases that stifle adaptation or automatically discount the utility of new ideas. The complexity of the knowledge involved also influences the learning process, affecting both the mode of lesson distribution throughout the organization and how much time other members may need to absorb the new knowledge prior to applying it themselves. Finally, it is not simply the internal qualities of an organization that determine its ability to learn. External factors in the form of higher level guidance, outside assistance, or an adversary's behavior can shape the process by steering organizations to where they would not have gone otherwise, particularly when the unit lacks experience in the area concerned.

ADA450703 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)