Winning the Counterinsurgency Fight in Iraq: The Role of Political Culture in Counterinsurgency Warfare 2003-2006 in Iraq is written to provide insight into the importance of political culture in relation to developing a counterinsurgency strategy. This study answers the research question; how does the political culture of Iraq impact the U.S. ability to combat insurgency operations and establish an acceptable form of governance in Iraq? This monograph was developed using secondary research materials written by many of the political science scholars and experts on Iraq. The framework of this monograph originated from the work of David Galula; the author of Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice. In his book, Galula identifies the prerequisites for a successful insurgency which are: 1) cause, 2) weakness of the counterinsurgency, 3) geographic conditions, and 4) outside support. These prerequisites were use as a framework to approach the political culture of Iraq. The purpose of this monograph is to assess the importance of political culture in counterinsurgency warfare. Iraq was chosen as an area of focus because this is the focus of the U.S. counterinsurgency efforts and secondly, there is very little literature published about Iraq's political culture in particular. Political culture in Iraq is a complex issue which has its foundation in history and religion; however the U.S. government and our leader's tend to stay away from Iraq's religion as a subject. I submit that our counterinsurgency strategy is not as effective or efficient due to the lack of focus placed on understanding the political culture of Iraq and more importantly the religious connotations associated with political culture. As a result of this study, it is critical for the United States Government (U.S.G.) to alter their counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq to address the center of gravity (COG) which is the support of the counterinsurgency. Support is provided in two methods, one is passive and the other active. The U.S.G. should operate along five areas of focus or lines of operation (LOOs) to attack the COG. The LOOs are security, governance/ government, economy, cultural awareness, and leadership. These lines of operations were derived from input provided by the people of Iraq through the use of a survey conducted by Oxford Research. The findings from the research determined that as the political culture of Iraq remains in a state of transition the U.S.G. must demonstrate progress to the people of Iraq who are growing restless with the instability of the country. The counterinsurgency effort requires the support of all elements of national power, nongovernmental organizations, and governmental departments. Time is crucial to the counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq because first the war costs are straining the economy and two the U.S. citizens' support is waning just as it did in the Vietnam conflict. The U.S. can not afford another Vietnam War.

ADA450481 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)