No one can predict the future but you must prepare for it. The standing joint task force (SJTF) headquarters concept in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) was an attempt to prepare for the future by establishing permanent SJTF headquarters to meet the demands of the strategic-operational environment and to strengthen joint operations. The purpose of this research project was to determine if the SJTF headquarters concept is the first step in transforming U.S. cold war organizations. The research approach focused on the strategic-operational environment, joint doctrine, joint culture, and JTF lessons. The conclusions and recommendations focus on JTF headquarters efficiency; intentionally, they do not focus on success or failure. The essence is to determine if the SJTF headquarters is more efficient than other JTF headquarters options. During crises, the geographic commander in chief (CINC) may decide to establish a JTF headquarters using one of three available options: form an ad hoc headquarters, augment a subordinate service component headquarters, or use an existing standing JTF headquarters. Ad hoc headquarters were clearly the worst option because they were composed of disparate elements that lacked the common understanding and teamwork required for unified action; they lacked the ability to focus all efforts towards a common purpose because they had to undergo a substantial building effort to form, equip, organize, and train the headquarters during the crises. Examples where the CINC augmented existing service headquarters to create a JTF headquarters proved to be more efficient than ad hoc headquarters because they provided a nucleus that had trained together as a team; however, after action reports identified deficiencies in joint, interagency, and coalition training and experience. These JTF headquarters required significant augmentation to make up for lack of expertise in crisis action campaign planning. Moreover, this augmentation required time to train and integrate into the existing headquarters. The SJTF headquarters has the best potential to be the CINC's most efficient JTF headquarters option. SJTF experiences (service interaction in a joint-interagency-coalition environments) will forge joint culture over time in the form of new beliefs, traditions, and values. Jointness is synonymous with culture and culture is synonymous with experience. The SJTF headquarters offers the promise of positive experiences to reinforce change to achieve more efficient joint-interagency-coalition operations. The SJTF offers an opportunity to transform the way the U.S. Armed Forces employs the unique contributions of the individual services from distinct instruments playing simultaneously to a joint symphony. The SJTF is better suited than other JTF headquarters options to integrate the individual service capabilities to create synergism --a joint symphony. Nonetheless, the joint symphony is just an intermediate objective in the effort to achieve national unified action. Jointness is about confluence. Just as the Mississippi river gathers power from the confluence of its tributaries (the Illinois, Missouri, Ohio, and Arkansas rivers) the U.S. Armed Forces must harness the power of its tributaries (the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps) to achieve the power of confluence --synergy. A cohesive joint force requires service confluence and career paths that expose tomorrow's senior leaders to the power of jointness. Time is the ultimate arbiter of the SJTF's strategic-operational efficiency and its ability to strengthen joint operations. However, the success or failure of the SJTF headquarters depends upon several critical decisions: the SJTF joint manning document, the ultimate source of these joint billets, and a comprehensive joint education and training program. These decisions warrant independent research and analysis but force planners must treat them as interdependent variables in the application of the military instrument of power (through joint, interagency, and multinational operations) in the complex system encompassing national interests and values.

ADA 445045 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)